Research
I work primarily in epistemology, metaethics, and the theory of normativity. The unifying theme of my work is that our actual practices of deliberation constrain what we ought to believe and ought to do.
Research
I work primarily in epistemology, metaethics, and the theory of normativity. The unifying theme of my work is that our actual practices of deliberation constrain what we ought to believe and ought to do.
Publications
"Epistemic Insurance Policies" — Winner of 2026 Young Epistemologist Prize
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, provisionally accepted
A paper in defense of a class of epistemic norms which insure our intellectual lives against error.
"Believe It or Not: Transparency Is False"
A paper rejecting the common view that doxastic deliberation is transparent to what's true. En route, I argue that we can believe (at least partly) on the basis of non-epistemic reasons.
"Deliberative Control and Eliminativism About Reasons for Emotions"
A paper arguing for the revisionary conclusion that there are no normative reasons for emotions.
"The Deliberative Constraint on Reasons"
In Progress
Below are some projects at various stages of development, along with some brief comments about their contents/upshots. Shoot me an email if you'd like to read these WIPs, or if you have comments/questions about any of them.
A paper on the truth norm (under review)
A paper defending the idea that there is no truth norm on belief, using the deliberative constraint on reasons. I generalize the strategy used here in my "Norms Must Be Followable" paper below.
A paper on reliabilism (under review)
A paper arguing that the reliabilist's standard response to the problem of followability exposes reliabilism to a dilemma. I conclude that reliabilism has little role, if any, to play in normative epistemology.
"Norms Must Be Followable" (in progress)
A paper connecting norms to reasons and reasons to the deliberative constraint. A result of my view is that we should resist a family of entrenched distinctions in normative philosophy—between criteria of rightness versus decision procedures; primary versus secondary norms; and objective versus perspectival oughts.
"Humility vs. Suspicion—or, Why Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud Are Not Humble" (in progress)
A paper distinguishing norms of humility from norms of suspicion—and defending the latter.
Deepfakes, Skepticism, and the Age of Suspicion (in progress)
A paper arguing that all leading theories of perceptual/testimonial justification yield the same verdict: because of the quantity and quality of deepfakes, we're usually unjustified in taking audio/visual content at face value. I then argue that suspicion should be the default attitude.
"Imperfect Doxastic Duties" (in progress)
A paper motivating the idea of an imperfect doxastic duty, drawing on Kantian ethics—in pursuit of solving a number of epistemological puzzles, and also defending a modest form of intrapersonal permissivism.
What's Involved In Doing Something for a Reason? (in progress)
A paper offering a partial answer to its namesake. The primary aim is to vindicate an (oft-assumed) bridge principle according to which motivating reasons must be able to be premises in deliberation. This paper responds to objections others have had to my "Deliberative Control and Eliminativism About Reasons for Emotions".