Abstract: Some people think that there are normative reasons for emotions. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises: (1) a fact F is a reason for agent A to have (or refrain from having) an attitude X only if A can deliberate to (or away from) X at least partly on the basis of F; (2) no one can deliberate to any emotion. Taken together, these two premises entail that there are no reasons for emotions. Strong Eliminativism might seem radical, but I argue that this conclusion is much less counterintuitive than it may seem. 

[penultimate draft | preprint]

A highly condensed version has been published at the blog New Work in Philosophy [link].

Must reasons be able to feature in our deliberation? Proponents of a deliberative constraint on reasons endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Deliberative constraints enjoy broad appeal and have been deployed as premises in support of a variety of controversial philosophical positions. Yet, despite their uses, deliberative constraints have not received systematic philosophical attention. This entry aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, I sketch what’s at stake in the debate over whether a deliberative constraint is true. Then, I offer a taxonomy of the different versions of a deliberative constraint. Finally, I assess some of the arguments for and against a deliberative constraint. 

This paper is a condensed version of the first chapter of my dissertation.

[draft | published version]

Abstract: Transparency – the view that the deliberative question whether to believe P inevitably gives way to the question whether P – is an enduringly popular view, often taken by its proponents to be datum. In this paper, I argue that transparency is false. I begin by teasing out two core commitments of transparency: (i) the set of possible answers to the question whether to believe P is the same set of possible answers to the question whether P; (ii) the question whether to believe P can be settled on the basis of all and only those considerations on the basis of which the question whether P can be settled. Then, I offer two arguments against transparency, targeting (i) and (ii) respectively. I conclude with a cursory error theory of why transparency seems attractive in the first place. 

Abstract: It’s often held that there is a norm of truth on belief––i.e. believe P iff P is true. In this paper, I argue that there is no truth norm on belief. I show that, on three plausible accounts of what norms are, the truth norm entails that the fact that P is true is a reason to believe P. I then argue that these “reasons” run afoul of a deliberative constraint on reasons. The fact that P is true cannot intelligibly be used in deliberation about whether to believe P, for to use this fact in deliberation is to already have answered whether to believe it. Thus, agents can’t bear the right relation to this fact to make their use in deliberation intelligible. Given the deliberative constraint, then, these facts can’t constitute reasons, and therefore, there is no truth norm on belief.

Abstract: We all like to think that our most deeply held beliefs—about morality, politics, justice, and society—are based on good reasons. But often, they are not. Worse, we may not even be able to tell: motivated reasoning, echo chambers, misinformation, upbringing, and ideology shape our thinking without our awareness, putting us at risk of holding beliefs that feel well-founded but aren’t. In this paper, I explore how we ought to respond to epistemic risk: the risk that, unbeknownst to us, we are in a bad epistemic position. I argue that, just as we ought to buy insurance to protect ourselves against various risks, we should adopt epistemic insurance policies—practices that safeguard us from error in case we are, in fact, getting things wrong. These might include double-checking our reasoning, diversifying our sources, and revising our views in light of disagreement. Although taking out these policies might carry certain costs, I argue that these costs are worthwhile, given the high moral and political stakes of error.

Advisor: Alex Worsnip

Committee: Jim Pryor; Sarah Stroud

Spring 2022 – Present.

Abstract: In my dissertation, I defend and apply the idea that deliberation constrains normativity. In the first chapter, I defend a deliberative constraint on reasons. In the second, I argue that there are no reasons for emotions. In the third chapter, I argue against transparency, thereby leaving room for affirming both a deliberative constraint and the existence of pragmatic reasons for belief. In the fourth, I argue that there is no norm of truth on belief. In the fifth, I advance and defend my own preferred framework for epistemic norms, which I term "epistemic insurance policies".